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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON C. McGAVIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

PREFERRED INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a .corporation, WAYNE
MURRAY and WAYNE MURRAY,
JR., doing business as MURRAY &
COMPANY, a co-partnership, UTAH
MOTOR CLUB, INC., a corporation,
and SAM ARGE,

Case No. 8714

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT
Appellant, the plaintiff below, in his brief at page
4, states that the ((prime question to be determined on
this appeal is whether the amended complaint states facts
upon which relief can be granted against the defendants
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and respondents or any of them." That is the only question before this court on appeal and is the identical issue
decided by the lower court upon respondents' motion to
dismiss. That court's decision dismissing the amended
complaint without prejudice is based upon the ground
set forth in said motion, namely, that the complaint fails
to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The trial
court's order of dismissal will not be disturbed in the
absence of clear error.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE AMENDED CO:MPLAINT VIOLATES
RULE 8 (a) and 8 (e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
POINT II
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN CONTRACT.
POINT III
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN TORT.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S AUTHORITIES ARE NOT IN
POINT.
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POINT V
THIS IS NOT A CASE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
POINT VI
THE STATEMENTS IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PERTAINING TO A FOREIGN CORPORATIO·N
ARE IRRELEVANT.
POINT VII
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT CONTAINS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I ·
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT VIOLATES
RULE 8 (a) and 8 (e) (1) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 8 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the complaint shall contain c:c: ( 1) a short and
plain statement of the claim, showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief, and ( 2) a demand for judgment for
the relief to which he deems himself entitled." Rule
8 (e) (1) states: c:c:Each averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise and direct." A reading of the amended
complaint shows it to be a glaring violation of those Rules.
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The complaint, repeated in full in appellant's brief, there
takes up about seven pages, and is anything but a short,
simple or a plain statement of the claim. It contains a
demand for judgment wholly inconsistent with the statement of any claim, whatever that claim may be, set forth
in the complaint. The amended complaint, like appellant's
brief, consists mostly of accusations, opinions, narration
of evidentiary material and conversations.
The most that can be gleaned from the amended
complaint (TR. 28-32) in the way of essential allegations
to establish a claim is that defendants Preferred Insurance
Exchange and Murray & Company appointed one Paul
J. Parrish as state agent in Utah to write insurance, with
instructions to appoint such agents
he deemed essential
to establish an organization through which insurance
could be sold." Parrish then appointed plaintiff as agent
for Preferred Insurance Exchange and to assist Mr. Parrish in the management of the state agency for the Exchange. It should be noted that the complaint does not
aver Mr. Parrish had any authority from the defendants
to appoint plaintiff as such assistant, but only as an insurance agent. The complaint is silent as to the other defendants' part in the appointment of Mr. Parrish or
plaintiff, and those defendants, therefore, had nothing to
do with said appointment.
ttas

Paragraph 6 of said complaint, together with paragraph 12, contains the only reference in the complaint to
any method or agreement as to plaintiff's compensation
for his work, efforts and expenditures allegedly performed
or incurred by plain tiff. In said paragraph 6 it is stated
that Mr. Parrish promised uthat plaintiff would be paid
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the regular agent's commission on all policies sold directly
by him and also receive a share of the overriding commissions on all insurance sold jn Utah for Preferred Insurance
Exchange." Mr. Parrish allegedly told plaintiff that he
would also have an opportunity for permanent employment at a substantial income, whatever that has to do
with this lawsuit. The type of payment set forth in paragraph 6 just quoted, namely, commissions, is customary
for an insurance agent. The complaint does not indicate
plaintiff had any right to look to any other source of
payment from defendants for his work or expenditures.
Contrary to what appellant's brief infers, the
amended complaint does not state a valid claim for payment of expenses or for work performed pursuant to any
agency established by any defendant. The complaint does
not set forth any amounts due for those items, and does
not even ask for such payment. In paragraph 12 of the
complaint plaintiff alleges that ((By said acts (whatever
that includes) defendant companies i repudiated their
agreement with plaintiff whereby they induced plaintiff
to render various services in building up a state organization on the promise of substantial commissions in the
future ... to his damage in the sum of $1 0,000.00." Such
an allegation cannot be considered a prayer for compensation or reimbursement for work or expenditures, but
is apparently a demand for damage payment for some
wrongful act in the nature of tort, supposedly committed
by defendants. The nature of this demand becomes apparent from a study of the remaining parts of the complaint, wherein plaintiff avers the defendants wrongfully
prevented him from continuing as an insurance agent for
defendants. Plaintiff asked for $10,000.00 ugeneral damSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ages" (Appellant's Brief, p. 26). Furthermore, respondents are unable to tell from the complaint wherein their
conduct was legally wrongful.
Respondents have presented the above analysis of the
subject complaint partly to see whether it meets the requirements of said Rule 8 of our Civil Procedure. Please
note that Rule 8 (a) and (e) are not in the alternative.
The pleading must be plain, simple, concise and direct.
Appellant's amended complaint is none of these. That is
one reason it fails to state a legal claim.
In a federal case from the U. S. Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia, Renshaw vs. Renshaw, 153 Fed. 2d
310, the lower court granted, without prejudice, a motion
to dismiss the complaint, the motion being partly on the
ground that the pleading failed to state a claim, and
partly that some of its averments were not simple, concise
and direct as required by Rule 8 (e) . The order granted
the motion without comment. The allegations were more
specific than in the present case. In affirming the judgment of dismissal the appellate court announced:
uThe complaint itself was fourteen printed pages,
of the size and style customary in printing joint
appendices to briefs in this court, and the seven
exhibits attached thereto were another seventeen
printed pages. The dismissal, without prejudice,
of a complaint upon the basis of Rule 8 (e) (I) is
largely within the discretion of the trial court. We
will not disturb its action unless we find clear error.
We :find none here."
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POINT II
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN CONTRACT.
Let us further examine the complaint. Does it set
forth the requirements of a binding contract and a cause
of action against defendants for its breach? Where is the
consideration moving from plaintiff? There is none. For
all that appears in the complaint, plaintiff had no obligation as an agent; gave nothing for his appointment as
agent, and could refuse to act or could resign at any time
with impunity. The alleged agency was for an indefinite
period. It could be cancelled by either plain tiff or defendant at any time. If the supposed agreement was not
to be completed within a year, it violated the Statute of
Frauds.
Paragraph 7 of the complaint contains a long list of
alleged ((promises" of defendant Preferred Insurance Exchange which, according to paragraph 10, were all broken
by ((said defendants," whatever party that may be. But
there were no legally enforceable promises to break.
Plaintiff gave no consideration for any such promises. The
complaint does not even allege plaintiff suffered damage
from a ((violation" of any of these so--called promises. In
paragraph 8 of the complaint it cannot be ascertained
which of ((said defendants" allegedly told plaintiff the
various things there set forth, because paragraph 7 refers
specifically to ((promises" of Preferred Insurance Exchange
and Preferred Underwriters, and paragraph 8 seems to be
a continuation of the narration in paragraph 7. Furthermore, paragraph 8, like 7, does not indicate that plaintiff
had any right to expect payment for his services from a
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source other than sales commissions; and neither paragraph
discloses any contractual duty owed plaintiff by defendants.
Paragraph 9 of the amended complaint alleges among
other things that plaintiff appointed state agents, while
paragraph 10 complains that plaintiff did not have the
power of attorney necessary to make such appointments.
Why should plaintiff reasonably incur expense in appointing agents until he had such authority? While paragraph
9 refers to other general, somewhat vague services allegedly performed by plaintiff, none of those services is made
the basis of any legal claim by plaintiff in the amended
complaint. The only paragraph referring to any udamages," number 12, speaks of uvarious services" rendered
by plaintiff ((in building up a state organization," whatever such various services were. The complaint does not
ask anything for, nor place any value on, such services,
and an essential element for such a claim therefore is
absent. In paragraph 12 the figure of $10,000.00 is given
as damages but on what account or theory, escapes these
respondents. That :figure is one generously plucked from
the air. At page 26 of appellant's brief is another reference
to this :figure of $10,000.00 as ugeneral damages."
POINT III
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN TORT.
Appellant's brief attempts to construct some ((facts,"
or n1ore truly, arguments, on which to base a claim for a
tort. The complaint gives no grounds for any relief on
such theory. The statements made in appellant's brief
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are immaterial to a consideration of that point as well as
the other points raised by the subject appeal. See, for instance, the arguments, conclusions and unfounded charges
set forth at pages 12, 16 through 20, and 24 through 26
of said brief. Such matter has no proper place in this
appeal. The court must consider only what is alleged in
the amended complaint.
According to the complaint, the tortious conduct of
the defendants supposedly arose from certain dealings
between defendants and Utah Motor Club and its manager, Sam Arge, whereby the Motor Club was made a
state insurance agent in place of Paul Parrish. The complaint fails to show by what legal right plaintiff could
object to such a transaction. Where is shown the duty
of defendants not so to deal with Utah Motor Club? If
anyone had the right to complain, it would be Parrish, who
is not even a party to this lawsuit. Clear1y Utah Motor
Club, Inc. and Sam Arge owed no duty to plaintiff to
refrain from the new agency arrangement and cannot
be held for causing any breach of a contract which was
terminable at the will of either party, and to which plaintiff was not even a party or a third party beneficiary.
Obviously the other defendants cannot be liable to plaintiff on a tort theory or otherwise for terminating Parrish's
contract and making one with the Motor Club. Defendants needed no consent of plaintiff to do that. The complaint does not even state that the new arrangement was
unsatisfactory to plaintiff, or resulted in any termination
of plaintiff's employment.
A significant point not only as to this tort theory
advanced in appellant's brief, but as to any claim based
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on contract, express or implied, is that defendants did not
terminate plaintiff's agency relationship. What did end
plaintiff's employment, according to the complaint itself,
is the condition added by the Motor Club after it had been
appointed state agent, to the effect that plaintiff could
sell insurance only to club members, under an arrangement
which was ((illegal." The complaint does not allege or
show that the making of such condition was authorized,
approved or ratified by either of the other defendants,
respondents here, Preferred Insurance Exchange or Murray & Company. They had no part in it.
POINT IV

APPELLANT'S AUTHORITIES ARE NOT IN
POINT.
The cases presented by appellant to support his theory
as to reimbursement for services performed and expenses
incurred are not in point. Respondents have no quarrel
with the principles announced in such decisions, but respectfully submit that the facts therein presented are far
from our situation. In each case listed under Point II of
the argument in appellant's brief, the complaint clearly
sets forth the services and expenses performed and incurred, and the value placed on each item by the plaintiff;
and further, the complaint contains a clear demand for
judgment for those amounts. The plaintiff, in those decisions, made a .binding agreement to perform as agent
and clearly had authority to incur the particular expenses.
In the case of Hall v. Douglas Aircraft Co., (Cal. App.),
73 P. 2d 668, cited on p. 14 of appellant's brief, the plaintiff agent performed work that led to the sale of the parSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ticular airplanes he was appointed to sell. In the Utah
case of Hoyt v. Wasatch Hon-tes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.
2d 927, also cited in appellant's brief, the agent's complaint
set forth a value for his services, based. on an agreed commission, and the demand of the complaint was for judgment for that amount. In that decision the agent
performed the work agreed upon in obtaining a prospective purchaser of the property. In all of the cases cited by
appellant, the defendant principal terminated the agency
contract, such fact was set forth in the complaint, and. its
causal connection with the failure of the agent to receive
compensation or reimbursement prayed for in the complaint was well defined in the pleadings. Furthermore,
each of those cases was concerned with an enforceable,
.clearly stated contract relationship, with certain mutual
obligations of the parties well outlined in the pleadings.
Such is not the condition of the complaint now before this
court.
The quotations from the Restatement of the Law,
Agency, Chapter 14, presented on pages 14 and. 15
of appellant's brief, are likewise not in point. The amended
complaint does not set forth facts to bring it within any
situation contemplated in the Restatement of Law.
Appellant's whole argument to sustain Point II of
his brief, wherein he claims he is entitled to some compensation or reimbursement, appears to be an afterthought.
His complaint does not present any justifiable grounds
for that argument. The matters presented by appellant
under that point are outside the bounds of the amended
complaint which defendants' motion attacks, and their
presentation in the brief is highly irregular.
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POINT V
THIS IS NOT A CASE OF UNJUST ENRICH~
MENT.
Appellant's amended complaint as well as his brief
contains some references indicating a theory for relief
against defendants on the gro"Linds of unjust enrichment.
For instance, paragraph 10 of the complaint states that
defendants ((procured from plaintiff the list of contacts
of insurance prospects ... for the purpose of giving the
same to Utah Motor Club, Inc. to enable it to reap benefits from the efforts of the plaintiff." (Plaintiff's complaint does not charge that defendants obtained said list
wrongfully.) Said paragraph further alleges that defendants were negotiating uto deprive plaintiff of present and
future compensation by way of overriding commissions.
. . ." The complaint, at most, accuses defendants of an
intention to obtain some benefit from the alleged acts,
but does not state any defendant received such benefit,
and the prayer of the complaint has nothing to do with the
theory of unjust enrichment.

POINT VI
THE STATEMENTS IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PERTAINING TO A FOREIGN CORPORATION
ARE IRRELEVANT.
At pages 20 through 23 of his brief appellant brings
up the point that Preferred Underwriters, Inc. is a noncomplying corporation. At no time has any defendant
raised a defense that Preferred Insurance Exchange is
immune from liability. The motion of defendants to disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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miss the complaint is not based in any respect on that
ground, and defendants did not raise that point in argument before the lower court. Furthermore, none of the
defendants is attempting to enforce any contract in this
lawsuit, and appellant's amended complaint does not allege
liability or seek to enforce a claim against defendants on
the ground that a defendant has failed to qualify to do
business in Utah. Respondents are unable to see in what
way said Point III of appellant's brief is relative to this
appeal.
POINT VII
APPELLANT'S AMENDED CO·MPLAINT CONTAINS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES.
Respondents take the position that appellant has no
claim for punitive damages, first, because the complaint
does not state any facts upon which relief should be
granted appellant for any damages, and, second, that if
any grounds for relief were stated in said com plaint, there
is still no support in law or in fact for the demand that
defendants be assessed punitive damages. The lower court
could find no support for appellant's claim for those
damages, and appellant's brief presents no legal authority
for such claim. Respondents do not know of any court
decision or statute which even indicates support for that
position.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court correctly granted respondents' motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that
it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
It is fitting and just that no such pleading be allowed to
stand upon the court records of this state, and that appellant be required to file a proper complaint. Respondents
respectfully urge that this Court af{irm the Third District
Court's Judgment dismissing the amended complaint
without prejudice, and that respondents be awarded their
costs of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
W. J. O'CONNOR, JR.

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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